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ABSTRACT
Economists generally believe that countercyclical fiscal policies have stabilizing effects that work
through automatic stabilizers and discretionary actions. Analyses underlying this conventional
wisdom focus on intratemporal margins: how employment and personal income respond in the short
run to changes in government expenditures and taxes. But in economic downturns, countercyclical
policies increase government indebtedness, raising future debt service obligations. These new
expenditure commitments must be financed by some mix of higher taxes, lower spending, or higher
money growth in the future. Expectations of how future policies will adjust change current savings
rates and the efficacy of countercyclical policies. It is thus possible for responses to expected future
policies to exacerbate and prolong recessions. This paper highlights these expectations effects.
Connecting the theory to U.S. data we find: (1) through this expectations channel, countercyclical
policies may create a business cycle when there would be no cycle in the absence of countercyclical
policies; (2) nontrivial fractions of variation in investment and velocity can be explained by variation
in macro policies alone---without any nonpolicy sources of fluctuation; and (3) persistence in key
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1. Introduction
Economists generally believe that countercyclical ﬁscal policies have stabilizing
eﬀects that work through both automatic stabilizers and occasional discretionary
actions.
1 Analyses underlying this conventional wisdom focus on intratemporal mar-
gins: how employment and personal income respond in the short run to changes in
government expenditures and taxes.
But in economic downturns, countercyclical policies increase government indebt-
edness, raising future debt service obligations. And these new expenditure commit-
ments must be ﬁnanced by some mix of higher taxes, lower spending, and higher
money growth in the future. Expectations of how future policies will adjust change
current savings rates and can matter for the eﬃcacy of countercyclical policies.
2 In-
deed, it is possible for responses to expected future policies to exacerbate and prolong
recessions.
Countercyclical ﬁscal policies necessarily create dynamic links between current and
future policies. Although the ultimate response of the aggregate economy to counter-
cyclical policies must include an intertemporal dimension, many analyses break this
intertemporal link and place the implications of expectations of future policies in the
background.
We employ a general framework in which macro policies aﬀect both intratemporal
and intertemporal margins. This paper specializes the general framework to present
results that highlight the role of expectations eﬀects. Three ﬁndings emerge:
Date: December 6, 2005. Department of Economics, Clemson University, gd@clemson.edu; De-
partment of Economics, Indiana University and NBER, eleeper@indiana.edu.
1See, for example, Duesenberry, Eckstein, and Fromm (1960), Hansen (1969), Blinder and Solow
(1973), Baily (1978), Tobin (1980), Christiano (1984), Romer and Romer (1994), Chatterjee (1999),
Romer (1999), Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Cohen and Follette (2000), and Taylor (2000).
2Baxter and King (1993) emphasize that the impacts of government spending changes depend on
how the spending is ﬁnanced.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 2
• Through the expectations channel, countercyclical policies may be counter-
productive by creating a business cycle when there would be no cycle in the
absence of countercyclical policies.
• Nontrivial fractions of variation in investment and velocity can be explained
by variation in macro policies alone–without any nonpolicy sources of ﬂuc-
tuation.
• Persistence in key macro variables can arise solely from expectations of policy.
These ﬁndings are provocative. They do not necessarily contradict the view that
on net countercyclical policies have been eﬀective. But given the counterproductive
eﬀects stemming from expectations eﬀects, if conventional wisdom is correct that
countercyclical policies dampen the cycle, the intratemporal eﬀects must be substan-
tially more powerful than earlier studies have claimed.
We derive these ﬁndings from simple dynamic reasoning that leads to the coun-
terproductivity of countercyclical ﬁscal policies and then tie that logic to U.S. data
to ﬁnd empirical support for the reasoning. The economic logic is straightforward:
during an economic downturn countercyclical policies create a debt-ﬁnanced budget
deﬁcit; if agents expect that taxes will rise in the future, then the expected return
on investment declines, exacerbating any reduction in investment associated with the
downturn. With the capital stock lower than it would otherwise be, output remains
low for a longer period: the downturn is deeper and more prolonged than it would be
in the absence of countercyclical policies.
We connect this reasoning to U.S. data on policy variables. Equating expectations
to realizations of policies–imposing perfect foresight–we simulate a dynamic general
equilibrium monetary model, calibrated to U.S. data. We ﬁnd that realizations of
current and expected policy variables alone generate a cycle in investment and money
demand that coincides with the NBER business cycle dates. In the absence of any
change in current or expected policies, portfolio choices would be constant in the
model, so any cycle obtained from the simulation is generated solely by policy.
Auerbach (2003) discusses a number of reasons why it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd persuasive
evidence of the impacts of ﬁscal policy on the economy. He singles out expectations
as the most diﬃcult problem. Although perfect foresight is an extreme assumption
about how agents form expectations of policy, it is nonetheless striking that we ﬁnd
compelling evidence that expected ﬁscal policies matter. Our emphasis on expecta-
tions contrasts with the often complete absence of a role for expectations in work
underlying the conventional wisdom that countercyclical policies eﬀectively stabilize
the economy (Romer and Romer 1994).3
3See also Sargent’s (2002) comments on Romer and Romer (2002).COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 3
Although they may contradict conventional wisdom, our ﬁndings are in line with
recent results from dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Chari, Christiano,
and Kehoe (1994) ﬁnd that optimal ﬁscal policy improves on observed U.S. policies
both by reducing the variability of key macro variables and by raising welfare. Jones
(2002) ﬁts a model to U.S. data and ﬁnds that ﬁscal policy provided little stabilization
and in some cases may be destabilizing. Our ﬁndings certainly conﬁrm that actual
policy behavior has increased the variance of investment and velocity and prolonged,
rather than shortened, economic downturns.
Bohn’s (1991) work can be viewed as providing empirical support for the existence
of the expectations channel. He ﬁnds that historically U.S. government debt expan-
sions have been followed by subsequent spending cuts and tax increases. Our results
may be interpreted as reporting the business cycle consequences of Bohn’s ﬁndings.
The paper begins by laying out a general theoretical structure in which expectations
of policy play a key role in determining the current equilibrium. To obtain the
analytical solutions required to completely specify the dependence of the equilibrium
on current and expected policies, we restrict the model by assuming speciﬁc functional
forms. In the following sections we calibrate the model to U.S. data and simulate
perfect foresight paths using U.S. policy variables. The resulting simulated time
series are solely a product of realizations of current and expected policy variables,
with no nonpolicy exogenous shocks.
2. A General Framework
This section describes a general equilibrium model of ﬁscal ﬁnance in the spirit of
Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995). Like Sargent and Wallace (1981), we model only
the ﬁscal ﬁnancing role of monetary policy.
As in Heckman (1976) and Lucas (1988), the household supplies eﬀective labor
given by hn, where h is human capital and n is hours worked. Gross output is produced
with the constant returns to scale technology f(k,hn), where k is physical capital.
We denote gross output at t, f(kt−1,h t−1nt), by f(t). Output net of undepreciated
capital, yt, satisﬁes the accounting identity:
ct + xkt + xht + gt = yt, (1)
where xk and xh are investment in physical and human capital, and g is government
purchases. The two capital stocks evolve according to
kt = xkt + d
k(kt−1,h t−1nt) (2)COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 4
ht = xht + d
h(kt−1,h t−1nt), (3)
where d(·,·) represents undepreciated capital, which we denote by d(t).
2.1. Firms. There are two representative ﬁr m st h a tr e n tf a c t o r so fp r o d u c t i o nf r o m
households and sell their outputs back to households. The goods producing ﬁrm rents
k at rental rate r and hires eﬀective labor hn at wage rate w to solve
max
kt−1,ht−1,nt
DGt = f(kt−1,h t−1nt) − rtkt−1 − wtht−1nt.( 4 )
T h et r a n s a c t i o n ss e r v i c e sp r o d u c i n gﬁrm hires labor l at wage rate wT to solve
max
lt
DTt = PTtT(lt) − wTtlt,( 5 )
with PT the price of transactions services relative to consumption goods. Production
functions are strictly concave and diﬀerentiable. Both ﬁrms behave competitively,
t a k i n ga l lp r i c e sa sg i v e n .
2.2. Households. The representative household owns the ﬁrms and pays taxes on












where z is transfer payments from the government. Because r and wn are the returns
on gross capital assets, we add back the tax levied against income derived from
undepreciated capital stocks.
The household’s expenditures on consumption and new capital goods at date t
must be ﬁnanced with real money balances carried over from the previous period,
Mt−1/Pt, or with transactions services, Tt,t os a t i s f yt h ec o n s t r a i n t
Mt−1
Pt
+ Tt(ct + xt) ≥ ct + xt,( 7 )
where xt = xkt + xht is total investment in capital. Transactions services can be
thought of as a clearinghouse, money market mutual funds, or credit cards and the
labor supplied to that sector reﬂects resources used in producing the services. Those
resources should not be construed as “labor supply” in the same sense that nt is.
The household consists of a worker-shopper pair. Each member of the household
is endowed with a unit of time. The worker supplies nt units of time to the goods
producing ﬁrm and the shopper supplies lt units of time to the transactions services







tU(ct,l t,n t), 0 <β<1,( 8 )
where 1 − nt is leisure for the worker and 1 − lt is leisure for the shopper, subject to
(7), the budget constraint
ct + kt + ht +
Mt + Bt
Pt




the evolution of the capital stocks, (2) and (3), and 0 ≤ nt,l t ≤ 1. Future government
policy is the sole source of uncertainty; the operator E in (8) denotes equilibrium
expectations of private agents over future policy. Bt is purchases of nominal one-
period government debt issued at t and it is the net nominal interest rate on debt
issued at t and due at t+1. The household starts with initial assets k−1 > 0,h −1 > 0,
and M−1 +( 1+i−1)B−1 > 0.
The government ﬁnances expenditures on goods, gt, and transfer payments, zt,b y















3. An Intertemporal Example
To analyze the potential for countercyclical policies to be counterproductive, we
specialize the model to obtain the analytical solutions required to completely specify
how the current equilibrium depends on current and expected policies. The specializa-
tion highlights the expectations channel through which countercyclical policies aﬀect
the economy. It is also convenient to consider future policies that are constant but
may diﬀer from current policies. This allows us to derive analytically the dynamic
linkages between current and future policies in equilibrium.
3.1. Assumptions. Assume labor is supplied inelastically to goods production (as in
Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi 1993) and set τk
t = τn






t−1 , 0 <σ<1,( 1 1 )
T(lt)=1− (1 − lt)
α, α>1,( 1 2 )COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 6
U(ct,l t,1) = log(ct)+γ log(1 − lt), γ>0,( 1 3 )
with γ/α < 1,
d
k(kt−1,h t−1)=σ(1 − δk)f(kt−1,h t−1), (14)
d
h(kt−1,h t−1)=( 1− σ)(1 − δh)f(kt−1,h t−1), (15)
with 0 ≤ δk,δh ≤ 1.4
There are no exogenous “shocks” to technology, preferences, or endowments. Re-
alizations of current and expected policy variables are the sole source of variation.
3.2. Solution5. With these restrictions the equilibrium can be deﬁn e di nt e r m so f
policy expectations, initial assets, and current government policy.
Our results focus on two aspects of portfolio choice: investment and money demand.
We express the choices in terms of their stationary counterparts–investment as a
share of expenditures and velocity.
Combining the Euler equations for physical and human capital yields a solution for
the total capital stock:










































Symmetry between the two capital stocks implies that in equilibrium ht/kt =( 1−
σ)/σ. Using this proportionality together with the solution (16) and the laws of motion











t) − (1 − δk)
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t) − (1 − δk)]
. (18)
Solving the Euler equation for money yields
4This speciﬁcation of depreciation is non-standard. We employ it to obtain an analytical solution,
which allows clearer interpretation. In future work it will be important to check the robustness of
results to the standard treatment of depreciation as proportional to the level of the capital stock.
































0 ≡ 1. (20)






























3.3. Interpretation. We characterize the equilibrium at date t in terms of pol-
icy expectations functions (μt,ηt), current government claims, s
g
t, and initial assets,
(kt−1,h t−1,M t−1,(1 + it−1)Bt−1). (μt,ηt), which summarize the information agents
need to form rational expectations about the equilibrium of the economy, capture the
portfolio balance eﬀects of expected policies.
μ is the marginal value of real money balances and is ubiquitous in dynamic mone-
tary models. All else equal, changes in μ imply changes in expected inﬂation and the
rate of return on money holdings. Expectation of a higher rate of money growth–
and therefore of seigniorage revenues–depreciates the value of money, lowers, μ, and
induces substitution away from money.
η captures two interdependent impacts of expected policies. One impact is a direct
tax distortion, which alters the private return on real assets. To isolate this eﬀect,
consider the impact of higher expected future taxes, holding future money growth and
government spending shares ﬁxed. Further suppose that debt is identically zero and,
in order to focus on substitution eﬀects, that the revenues collected through higher
distorting taxes are rebated lump sum to households. Higher future taxes reduce
the expected return on investment and induce agents to substitute from capital to
consumption. A lower expected return on capital also induces substitutions into
nominal assets, including money.
A second impact comes from η’s summary of the composition of expected ﬁscal
ﬁnancing in terms of the relative sizes of the real and inﬂation tax bases. ThisCOUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 8
trade-oﬀ can be seen heuristically from an alternative expression for the terms in
(1 − τ)/(1 − sg) that appear in the deﬁnition of η in (62). A transformation of the










,t ≥ 0. (23)
Terms in (1 − τ)/(1 − sg) reﬂect the fraction of private resources absorbed by the
acquisition of new nominal liabilities issued by the government. Higher η indicates an
expected shift in future ﬁnancing that expands the inﬂation tax base and contracts
the real tax base. By reﬂecting the relative sizes of the two tax bases, changes in
η generate an expected inﬂation eﬀe c tt h a ti sn o te m b e d d e di nt h en o m i n a li n t e r e s t
rate.
Expression (18) shows that the total impact of countercyclical ﬁscal policies consists
of a direct eﬀect, associated with ﬁxed η, a n da na m p l i ﬁcation eﬀect, due to induced
changes in η. Countercyclical policy raises s
g
t when the economy contracts. Hold
expected policies ﬁxed initially. Expansionary ﬁscal policy has a direct (negative)
eﬀect on investment, and the elasticity of that direct eﬀect depends on ηt, the index
of expected policies being held ﬁxed. Direct eﬀects arise because an increase in
s
g
t reduces current disposable income; how that reduction gets apportioned between
consumption and investment depends on ηt. Al o w e rv a l u eo fη reﬂects an expectation
of either higher taxes or lower government spending. Lower η raises the elasticity of
equilibrium investment with respect to current government spending.
As e c o n de ﬀect of countercyclical ﬁscal policies may arise. If higher s
g
t induces
agents to change their expectations of future tax rates or government spending shares,
then the direct eﬀects may get ampliﬁed. Suppose that debt-ﬁnanced cyclical in-
creases in spending create a recognition that future taxes must rise. This reduces ηt,
amplifying the reduction in investment that higher s
g
t entails.
Expected policies may increase velocity in two ways. First, higher expected money
growth reduces the return on real balances (lower μ) and induces substitution out of
money into transactions services. Second, lower expected taxes or higher expected
government spending (higher η) induces substitution out of nominal assets into real
assets.
3.4. Equilibrium Expectations. Equilibrium requires that current and future poli-
cies satisfy the government’s budget constraint and that agents’ expectations of policy
6For simplicity we show this for the case of complete depreciation of capital and no government
transfers.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 9
are consistent with equilibrium. This creates interactions among current and future
policies, whose characterization is a novel feature of this paper.
We focus on circumstances in which the economy is in a stationary equilibrium in
the future (dates s>t ), but starts from some other position at date t. Assume future
policies are constant:






z,j > 0, (24)
where sz
t = zt/yt.
The government budget constraint can be expressed entirely in terms of current























Given expectations of policy embedded in ∆t and initial government indebtedness as
summarized by (1+it−1)Bt−1/Mt−1, (25) reports equilibrium trade-oﬀs among current
policies.
We now derive equilibrium trade-oﬀs among future policies given the state of gov-
ernment indebtedness. Shift the timing of (25) forward one period and assume future
interest liabilities are correctly anticipated at t by substituting the expression for
equilibrium it. For simplicity, assume the bond-money ratio is constant at (B/M)F in
the stationary equilibrium. Re-labeling variables dated t +1with an “F” subscript




























Given government indebtedness carried into the future, as summarized by (B/M)t,
(26) describes the trade-oﬀs among future policies that are consistent with ﬁxed ∆t
being an equilibrium.
Trade-oﬀs between (25) and (26) determine the interactions between current poli-
cies and expectations of future policies. Any change in policy at t that requires a
change in ∆t must be accompanied by a change in policy at date F that is consistent
with the new values of ∆t and the new level of government liabilities, (B/M)t.
4. Data Considerations




t,ρ t}, together with a calibration of the model to compute time seriesCOUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 10
for {μt,η t}. Countercyclical ﬁscal policies contain two components–automatic stabi-
lizers and “discretionary” policy changes. Automatic stabilizers arise from spending
programs and tax laws that adjust systematically with economic conditions. For ex-
ample, economic downturns raise unemployment compensation and other spending
programs. They also reduce tax revenues and, with a progressive tax code, tax rates.
Discretionary policy changes require Congressional actions to create new spending
initiatives or alter existing tax laws to counteract economic conditions. As Ando and
Brown (1963), Stein (1996), Minarik (1991), and Taylor (2000) document, discre-
tionary responses to cyclical variations occur in ﬁts and starts.
For our present purposes, nothing rests on the precise mechanism that produces
countercyclical policies. It is the expected response of future policies that matters.
In terms of current ﬁscal policies, countercyclical policy corresponds to lower than
normal output bringing forth a lower than normal tax rate and higher than normal
government expenditure shares. Figure 1 depicts the policy variables; vertical lines
mark NBER business cycle peaks and troughs.
Monetary policy responds over the cycle to two factors. First, to accommodate
the decline in money demand associated with an economic contraction, the Federal
Reserve reduces money growth. Second, to counteract the downturn, the Fed reduces
the nominal interest rate by increasing the growth of high-powered money. The net
eﬀect is procyclical money growth, which appears in statistical characterizations of
the data [Cooley and Hansen 1995]. This implies that seigniorage revenues tend to
decline when output falls.
Table 1 reports the time series facts.7 Correlations among cyclical components of
output and policy suggest very strong countercyclical behavior, as the last column
indicates. Both components of government spending, consumption and transfer pay-
ments, rise when output falls below trend and both components of revenues, direct
taxes and seigniorage, fall with output. The resulting budget deﬁcit is ﬁnanced by
debt expansion, so the debt-output ratio rises during economic downturns.
Thorny issues arise in connecting the theory to quarterly U.S. data from 1954-2002.
Because human capital investment is not separately recorded in national income ac-
counts, it must be gleaned from existing data. One approach is to extract the human
capital investment components of consumption, investment, and government con-
sumption. Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995), for example, interpret human capital
7sg and sz are ratios of total government consumption plus gross investment and transfer payments
to output; τ is the average tax rate, computed as total government receipts divided by output; ρ is
the quarterly growth rate of the monetary base.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 11
investment as composed of health care plus education expenditures, which are com-
ponents of personal consumption expenditures and government consumption.
Instead, we make the assumption that human capital investment consists largely of
non-market activities not captured by national income accounts. The model implies
that along a balanced growth path when δk = δh, ht/kt = xht/xkt =( 1− σ)/σ.W e
use this relationship to impute human capital investment, xht, from data on physical
capital investment, xkt. Our assumption also implies that measured GDP misses the
contribution of human capital, so we construct GDP from (1) as yt = ct+xkt+xht+gt.
We deﬁne c as personal consumption expenditures on nondurables plus services, xk as
g r o s sp r i v a t ed o m e s t i ci n v e s t m e n tp l u sd u r a b l e sc o n s u m p t i o n ,a n dg as federal plus
state and local consumption plus gross investment. In all the results that follow y
denotes this constructed output notion.8
5. Calibration
The calibration is designed to match certain aspects of the long-run behavior of the
U.S. economy. We interpret that long-run behavior as the stationary equilibrium that
emerges from the model when policy variables are constant at (τ,sg,s z,ρ). Constant
policy variables imply constant expectations functions, (μ,η).
We interpret a time period in the model to be a quarter, so we set β = .9877 (Cooley
and Prescott 1995). Our method of introducing capital depreciation, shown in (2) and
(3), creates links between the capital share parameter, σ, and the depreciation rate,
δ, that implies that our capital share parameter should be scaled by (1 − δ) to make
it comparable to the share parameter in models where depreciation is proportional to
the capital stock.9 With a standard capital share of .36 (Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
1994), we set σ = .36/(1−δ). We choose the model’s two remaining free parameters,
δ and the ratio γ/α, to match time averages of actual U.S. data. We choose δ to
equate the model’s ratio xk/(c + xk) to the investment-private expenditures ratio in
U.S. data. This implies δk = δh = .0312. In the equilibrium γ and α appear only as a
ratio. We choose γ/α = .01134 to match the mean of velocity, (c+xk)/M/P.10 Table
2 summarizes the calibration.
The calibration implies a seigniorage-output ratio of .0024, consistent with U.S.
data, and transactions services as a share of output of .015. Diaz-Gimenez, Prescott,
8Appendix B describes the data.
9Consider Chari, Jones, and Manuelli’s (1995) speciﬁcation: f(k,h)=kαh1−α,k t = xkt +( 1−
d)kt−1,h t = xht +( 1− d)ht−1. The return on a unit of investment in k, excluding undepreciated
capital, is αf/k. The comparable return in our model is σ(1 − δ)f/k, so to make the two capital
shares comparable, we set σ = α/(1 − δ), where δ is the depreciation rate in our model.
10From 1954-2002, in U.S. data, xk/(c + xk)=.25 and (c + xk)/M/P =3 .03.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 12
Fitzgerald, and Alvarez (1992) estimate the size of the U.S. ﬁnancial intermediary
sector at between 3 and 7 percent of GNP while Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998)
calculate the cost to commercial banks of providing demand deposits and credit cards
to be between .5 and 1.1 percent of GNP. Our value of PTT/y seems reasonable.
We compute perfect foresight policy paths as a benchmark for specifying expecta-
tions. While this represents a limiting case in terms of how much information agents
possess about policy realizations, it is agnostic about policy behavior by not assum-
ing policy obeys time-invariant functions.11 Moreover, the {μt,ηt} sequences derived
from realizations of U.S. policy variables reﬂect any dynamic interactions of the kind
discussed in section 3.4 that are embedded in actual policy behavior. Perfect fore-
sight provides a benchmark to be contrasted with econometric methods for estimating
expectations. Applying perfect foresight to compute the functions {μt,ηt} over the
sample t =1 ,2,...,T requires specifying expected values of policy variables beyond
the sample. We assume policy realizations beyond the sample equal their means over
the full sample.12 To avoid solving a system of non-linear equations at each date, we
exploit recursive representations of {μt,η t} recorded in Appendix A.
6. Simulations
In addition to expressions (18) and (21), we report simulated paths for two other
variables that deﬁne investment and velocity more broadly. The additional variables

























U.S. data on portfolio choices exhibits clear cyclical patterns. Figure 2 plots the
cyclical components of two investment shares: xk/(c +xk) and x/y. The latter share
11Perfect foresight is a limiting case of the idea that agents have good information about tax rates
and government spending some quarters into the future. See Yang (2003) for a historical accounting
of the degree of foresight about U.S. tax policy and Yang (2004) for an exploration of the impact of
foresight on inferences about tax policy impacts.
12The handling of post-sample expectations has little eﬀect on the cyclical properties of the ratios
xk/(c +xk) and (c + xk)/M/P, though it does aﬀects the levels. See Gordon and Leeper (2000) for
sensitivity analysis in a closely related model.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 13
uses imputed data to compute both x and y. Vertical lines mark NBER business
cycle dates. Investment tends to peak just before business cycle peaks, while its
troughs coincide with business cycle troughs. Figure 3 records the cyclical parts of
two measures of velocity: (c + xk)/M/P and y/M/P. Again, the latter measure uses
imputed data to compute y. Velocity is also procyclical, though its peaks and troughs
align less well with the business cycle.
Figure 4 shows the cyclical components of the model’s investment shares. Both se-
ries exhibit cyclical behavior that coincides with the U.S. business cycle. Investment
is strongly procyclical in the data and the model reproduces this cyclicality remark-
ably well. In many instances model investment reaches a cyclical peak or trough in
precisely the same quarter that U.S. data does, though its volatility is less than in
data. The model even produces investment booms that coincide with actual data
(1965-1966, late 1972-early 1973, and 1984).
Figure 5 shows the cyclical parts of the model’s velocity measures. Model velocity is
weakly procyclical, falling in at least half the recessions. Rarely do its cyclical troughs
coincide with those of U.S. velocity, although velocity’s general cyclical pattern does
mimic actual data, especially in the past 30 years.
Table 3 compares summary statistics for our two investment shares and velocity
measures from U.S. data and the model. The model explains 24% to 38% of variation
in the level of the investment shares, and 21% to 34% at cyclical frequencies. It also
accounts for 29% to 33% of the standard deviation of the level of velocity, and 57%
to 73% at cyclical frequencies. Simulated data is highly persistent and its cyclical
components are even more persistent than U.S. data.
7. Concluding Remarks
These results are startling. All variation in the model stems from realizations
of current and expected future macro policies. If policy variables were constant,
simulated data would be constant. The cyclical pattern exhibited by simulated data
arises from countercyclical policies. Evidently, those policies have counterproductive
impacts.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 14
Appendix A. Model Derivations
A.1. First-Order Conditions. The ﬁrst-order conditions for the two kinds of ﬁrms
yield
rt = fk(t), (29)
wtnt = fh(t), (30)
wtht−1 = fn(t), (31)
wTt = PTtT
0(lt). (32)
Let ϕ be the lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint and λ be the
multiplier on the ﬁnance constraint. The household’s ﬁrst-order conditions are:
ct : Uc(t) − ϕt − λt(1 − Tt)=0 (33)
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A.2. Some Accounting. The following accounting identities are useful in solving
the model. Total goods must equal gross assets:
ct + kt + ht + gt = f(kt−1,h t−1nt), (41)
yt = f(kt−1,h t−1nt) − d
k(kt−1,h t−1nt) − d
h(kt−1,h t−1nt), (42)
ct + kt + ht =( 1− δσs
g
t)f(t), (43)
and deﬁne the share-weighted average depreciation rate as
δσ =1− σ(1 − δk) − (1 − σ)(1 − δh). (44)
From (42) and (60),
yt = δσf(t), (45)
ct + xt =( 1− s
g
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(1 − Tt)(ct + xt)
. (53)








































































































Adding (56) and (57) yields a diﬀerence equation in ˜ s :
1























δσ =1− σ(1 − δk) − (1 − σ)(1 − δh). (60)
T h es o l u t i o nt ot h i sd i ﬀerence equation is
1
1 − ˜ st
















































1 − ˜ st+k
=0 . (63)



























































0 ≡ 1. (66)














































ηt+1. (69)COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 18
Appendix B. Data
Unless otherwise indicated, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
c : Personal consumption expenditures on nondurables plus services, chained 1996
dollars.
xk : Personal consumption expenditures on durables plus gross private domestic
investment, chained 1996 dollars.
GF : Federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment, current
dollars.
G : Federal plus state and local government consumption expenditures and gross
investment, current dollars.
P : Implicit GDP deﬂator, chained.
gF :Real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment =
GF/P.
g : Real state and local government consumption expenditures and gross investment
= G/P.
TF : Total federal government tax receipts, current dollars.
T : Total federal plus state and local government tax receipts, current dollars.
ZF : Total federal government transfers = transfers to persons + grants-in-aid
to state and local governments + net interest + subsidies less current surplus of
government enterprises.
ZSL : Total state and local government transfers = transfers to persons + net
interest + subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises.
Z : Total federal plus state and local government transfers = ZF + ZSL.
z : Real total federal plus state and local government transfers = Z/P.
zF : Real total federal government transfers = ZF/P.
yF : Output (federal government only) = c + xk + gF.
y : Output (federal plus state and local government) = c + xk + g.
τF : Average tax rate (federal government only) = TF/(Py F).
τ : Average tax rate (federal plus state and local government) = T/(Py).
s
g
F : Federal government consumption and gross investment as share of output
= gF/yF.
sg : Federal plus state and local government consumption and gross investment as
share of output = g/y.
sz
F : Federal government transfers as share of output = zF/yF.
sz : Federal plus state and local government transfers as share of output = z/y.
k : Real capital stock = ﬁxed assets (under produced assets, NIPA Table 5.16, line
45) + nonfarm business inventories.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 19
M : Source base, current dollars, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, NSA, season-
ally adjusted using Census Bureau’s x12xp program.
ρt : Money growth rate = Mt/Mt−1.
B : Market value of privately held gross federal government debt, current dollars,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.






xky = xk/y.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 20
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Table 1. Correlations of Policy Variables with Output
Federal Plus State and Local Government
Correlation with Output








sg = g/y,sz = z/y,ρt = Mt/Mt−1. Cyclical components
derived from band-pass ﬁltered data using Baxter and
Kings’s (1999) algorithm to extract frequencies between
2 and 32 quarters with 3 years of padding.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 24
Table 2. Model Parameters and Stationary Equilibrium versus U.S. Data
Federal Plus State and Local Government
Parameter Variable Stationary U.S.
Values State Data
β = .9877 xk/(c + xk) .25 .25
σ = .3716 x/y .40 .40
δk = .0312 (c + xk)/M/P 3.03 3.03
δh = .0312 y/M/P 5.13 5.14








U.S. data are means computed from 1954:1-2002:4
Results for federal plus state and local government.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 25
Table 3. Portfolio Choice Statistics
Results for Federal Plus State and Local Government
Level Cyclical
(log) Component
Std. Dev. Serial Std. Dev. Serial
Variable (%) Correlation (%) Correlation
xk/(c + xk) (Data) 12.54 .976 4.12 .777
xk/(c + xk) (Model) 2.99 .983 .88 .821
x/y (Data) 11.00 .978 3.44 .783
x/y (Model) 4.14 .984 1.18 .823
vk (Data) 29.36 .999 1.77 .816
vk (Model) 9.61 .996 1.29 .880
vy (Data) 30.28 .998 2.27 .789
vy (Model) 8.71 .996 1.29 .884
U.S. data from 1954:1-2002:4; ﬁltered data from 1957:1-1999:4.
y denotes total output and is deﬁned as y = c + x + g, where x = xk + xh.
For the production function f(k,h)=kσh1−σ,x h = ((1 − σ)/σ)xk,
so for U.S. data, xh is imputed from data on xk using this factor.
Velocity measures are vk =( c + xk)/M/P and vy = y/M/P.COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICIES 26


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Perfect Foresight Model: Velocity
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